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Advance Informed Agreement: A Shared Basis

for Governing Trade in Genetically Modified
Organisms?
AARTI GUPTA*

INTRODUCTION

With its completion in January 2000, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

became the first legally binding global regime governing the transnational transfer
and use of genetically modified organisms.' The existence of this agreement is
noteworthy, given persisting normative and scientific conflicts over potential

harms (ecological, socioeconomic, or to human health) arising from the use of
genetically modified organisms.2
As its central governance mechanism, the Cartagena Protocol calls for the
"advance informed agreement" of an importing country before transnational
transfers of genetically modified organisms. The notion of "advance informed
agreement" has its genesis in the better-known concept of "prior informed
consent," which has been relied upon in the international realm to regulate trade in
hazardous waste and restricted and banned chemicals.3 However, in the case of
genetically modified organisms, the very existence and nature of hazard remains
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1. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M.
1027 (2000) [hereinafter Protocol].
2. For a general introduction to the science of genetic engineering, as well as an analysis of risks and benefits
associated with use of GMOs in agriculture, see generally ALAN MCHUGHEN, PANDORA'S PICNIC BASKEr THE
POTENTIAL AND HAZARDS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2000). For a more critical perspective, see
generally STEPHEN NOTTINGHAM, EAT YOUR GENES: How GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD Is ENTERING OUR
DIET (1998). For a discussion of ecological concerns relating to use of GMOs, see generally JANE RISSLER &
MARGARET MELLON, PERILS AMONG THE PROMISE: ECOLOGICAL RISKS OFTRANSGENIC CROPS INA GLOBAL

MARKET PLACE (1993).

For a discussion of socioeconomic considerations, see generally Zemede Asfaw &

Tewolde B.G. Egziabher, Possible Adverse Socio-economic Impacts of Genetically Modified Organisms, in
TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT OF LIVING MODIFIED ORGANISMS RESULTING FROM MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLICY-MAKERS (K.J. Mulongoy ed., 1997).
3. For an analysis of prior informed consent in the governing trade in chemicals, see Robert L. Paarlberg,
Managing Pesticide Use in Developing Countries, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 1993). For an analysis of the
hazardous waste regime, see generally Jonathan Krueger, PriorInformed Consent and the Basel Convention: The
Hazards of What Isn't Known, 7 J. ENV'T & DEV. 115 (1998).
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heavily contested.4 Under such circumstances, institutionalizing "advance
informed agreement" entailed a sustained battle between potential exporters of
genetically modified organisms, seeking predictability in trade, and potential
importers, seeking flexibility and discretion in national decision-making. How
have these competing objectives been reconciled within the Protocol's
governance mechanism of advance informed agreement?
In addressing this question, I focus on the decision criteria underlying
advance informed agreement, i.e., the criteria upon which importer decisions
about accepting or restricting genetically modified organisms are to be based.
Three such decision criteria were debated during the Cartagena Protocol
negotiations. These were sound science; the precautionary principle; and
socioeconomic considerations. Their definitions, as well as their relationship to
one another, remain heavily contested and transcend the is sue of biosafety, since
they have been disputed in other influential global fora such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO), as well. 5 I examine below the nature of conflicts over
decision criteria for advance informed agreement during negotiation of the
Cartagena Protocol, the final compromise, and the implications for biosafety
governance.
I. IMPLEMENTING ADVANCE INFORMED AGREEMENT:
DISPUTES OVER DECISION CRITERIA

During negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol, potential exporters of
genetically modified organisms were organized into the Miami Group, consisting
of countries at the forefront of producing "living modified organisms" (LMOs).6
This group includes the major LMO-producing and agriculture exporting

4. See AARTI GuPTA, FRAMING "BIOSAFETY" IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 5 (Belfer Ctr. for Sci. & Int'l
Affairs, ENRP Discussion Paper E-99-10, 1999) (The term "advance informed agreement" results from precisely
such conflict. It was insisted upon by the United States during negotiation of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) in 1992 to avoid use of the term "prior informed consent" (given its association with hazardous
substances) for GMOs.), at http://environment.harvard.edu/gea/pubs/e%2D99%2D10.pdf

5. The most prominent recent airing of disputes over these decision criteria within the WTO is evident inthe
transatlantic dispute between the United States and the European Union over trade in hormone treated beef. Sew;
e.g., WTO, Appellate Body, EC Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R
(Jan. 16, 1998), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu e/hormab.pdf [hereinafter EC Measures].

6. GMOs are called "living modified organisms" in the Protocol. This change was insisted on by the United
States to deflect attention from "genetic" modification as the focus of regulatory attention. I use the term "LMO"
in the remainder of this essay to ensure consistency with Protocol usage. For a more detailed analysis of this
language change, see generally Aarti Gupta, Creatinga Global Biosafety Regime, 2 INT'L J. BIoTEcn 2)5 (2000
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countries of Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, the United States, and Uruguay. 7
A coalition of pharmaceutical, food, and agricultural companies, the Global
Industry Coalition, supported the Miami Group in its push for predictability in
LMO trade. 8 Other key actors in the Cartagena Protocol negotiations include the
European Union, the "Like-Minded Group" of developing countries, and
environmental and consumer safety groups. 9 Table 1 below summarizes the main
divides over decision criteria during negotiation of the Protocol.
Table 1: Disputes over criteria for importer decision-making
Miami Group
European Union
Like-Minded Group
National decisions about
National decisions about
National decisions about
LMO transfers should be
LMO transfers should be
LMO transfers should be
based upon a sound
based upon a scientific
based upon scientific risk
scientific risk assessment
risk assessment and the
assessment; the
and should be
precautionaryprinciple; precautionary principle;
compatible with the WTO no deference to the WTO
and on socioeconomic
factors; no deference to
the WTO

As summarized in the table, a key divide between the Miami Group and the
European Union has been over whether a scientifically sound risk assessment, as
called for by the Miami Group and the Global Industry Coalition, should be the
7. See CLIVE JAMES, INT'L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH. APPLICATIONS [ISAAA], BRIEF

No. 8, GLOBAL REVIEW OF COMMERCIALIZED TRANSGENIC CROPS: 1998 iii-iv (1998) (In 1998, 27.8 million
hectares were planted with genetically modifed crops worldwide. Of this area, the United States contributed 74%,
Argentina 15%, Canada 10% and Australia 1%. Mexico, Spain, France, China, and South Africa constituted the
remaining, each with less than 1%. The main crops grown in 1998 were soybean (consisting of 52% of the global
area), corn (constituting 30%), as well as cotton, canola and potato. The main genetic modifications were for
herbicide tolerance (71% of all genetic modification) and insect resistance (2 1%). The growth in area devoted to
genetically modified crops from 1997 to 1998 (from I I to 27.8 million hectares) was concentrated in industrialized
countries. Global sales from transgenic crops were estimated at $75 million in 1995, $235 million in 1996, $670
million in 1997, and from $1.2-$1.5 billion in 1998.), http://www.isaaa.org/publications/briefs/Brief_8.htm.
8. Press Release, Global Indus. Coalition, Biodiversity Jeopardized in Cartagena Biosafety Negotiations (Feb.
16, 1999) (on file with author) (The Global Industry Coalition was established in 1998 and represents "over 2200
firms from more than 130 countries worldwide [and] includes companies from a variety of industrial sectors,
including plant and animal agriculture, food production, human and animal health care, forestry and the
environment.").
9. See Aarti Gupta, Searching for Shared Norms: Anticipatory Global Governance of Biosafety (2001)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with author) for a detailed analysis and history of the
genesis of these negotiating alliances. See also Aarti Gupta, Governing Trade in GeneticallyModified Organisms:

The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 42 ENV'T 23, 26 (2000) for additional analysis of the factors shaping the
biosafety perspectives of these groups.
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sole appropriate decision criterion, or whether the precautionary principle is also a
legitimate basis upon which to make decisions about LMO transfer and use. This
conflict is fueled partly by the increasing public opposition to genetically modified
organisms in Europe. 10 The central justification offered by the Miami Group and
the Global Industry Coalition for relying on sound science was that it provided the
only objective and standardized basis for a global biosafety governance regime.1
As stated emphatically by the Global Industry Coalition: "decisions under the
Protocol... must be based on sound and objective science. To do otherwise,
will severely undercut the effectiveness and integrity of the Protocol.... 2
A corollary to the call for sound science was that the precautionary principle
was an ill-defined, nebulous concept that was open to abuse and could serve as a
front to further protectionist or competition-driven trade agendas. Its status as a
principle was also questioned by the Miami Group, who viewed it as a poorly
defined approach to decision-making. 1 3 As one U.S. delegate noted, the
precautionary approach, as articulated in the 1992 Rio Declaration, 14 was "so
wide-open that you can drive a truck through it."' 5 Thus, as the Miami Group
and industry argued, using the precautionary approach as a criterion for importer
choice prior to trade in LMOs would make predictable global rules governing
such trade unattainable.

10. For an analysis of changing perceptions of LMOs in countries of the European Union, see George Gaskell et
al., Biotechnology and the European Public 18 NAT. BIOTECH. 935 (Sept. 2000).
11. For the perspective of a key Miami Group member, Australia, on the Protocol, see generally Austi. Dep't of
Foreign Affairs & Trade, at http://www.dfat.gov.au/environment/bsp.
12. Posting of Dr. Helma Hermans, Executive Secretary Green Industry Biotechnology Platform,
sciwrico@wirehub.nl, to Observers to the CBD Meeting (Feb. 10, 1999, 12:51 p.m.) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Posting from Dr. Helma Hermans]; see also Global Indus. Coalition, Basic Requirements for a
Successful Biosafety Protocol (Feb. 1999) (position paper on file with author) [hereinafter Basic Requirements];
Press Release, Cartagena, Columbia, Global Indus. Coalition, Biodiversity Jeopardized in Cartagena Protocol
Negotiations (Feb. 19, 1999) (on file with author).
13. For an interpretation of precautionary decisions as constituting an approach to decisionmaking rather than a
principle, and arguments made by the United States in the beef-hormone conflict, see EC Measures, supra nce 5.
For more detailed analysis of the beef hormone case, and, more generally, for options to reconcile the trade regime's
obligations with multilateral environmental agreements such as the Protocol, see also Frank Biermann, 7heRis*
Tide of Green Unilateralism in World Trade Law: Options for Reconciling the North-South Conflict, 35 J.
WORLD TRADE 421, 421-23 (2001).
14. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted by the U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, June 13, 1992, princ. 15, 31 I.L.M 874, 879 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] ("In order to
protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damages, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.").
15. Interview with Miami Group Delegate, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 1999) [hereinafter Interview with Miami
Group Delegate].
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On the other hand, those advocating a precautionary approach, including the
European Union and green groups, protested its characterization as antithetical to
science. 16 Green groups, in particular, argued that sound science in contested
areas such as biosafety was a science that was explicitly precautionary in the face
of scientific uncertainties. 7
While developing countries supported the European Union in its push to
include the precautionary principle as a legitimate decision criterion, this conflict
was primarily between the European Union and the Miami Group. For most
developing countries, the key concern was inclusion of non-scientific
socioeconomic considerations in the Protocol's decision criteria for advance
informed agreement. The socioeconomic concerns voiced by developing
countries, and supported by green groups, included new forms of dependencies
on technologically advanced countries or multinational companies as a result of
growing private ownership of transgenic seed. Concerns also included the
possible effect on traditional livelihoods of growing reliance on LMOs in
agriculture. In demanding that socioeconomic factors be included, developing
countries and green groups argued that concerns over LMO transfers
transcended narrowly-defined conceptions of harm that were assessable and
quantifiable through technical risk assessments (even those that could account for
8
scientific uncertainties).'
Most OECD countries and industry noted the extreme importance of
socioeconomic factors in national decision-making about adoption of new
technologies, yet insisted that such concerns were more suitably addressed

16. For a recent clarification of the European Union's view on the precautionary principle and its
implementation, see Communicationfrom the Commission on the PrecautionaryPrinciple, COMM'NOFTHEBEJR
COMMUNITIES (Feb. 2, 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/healthconsumer/library/
pub/pub07_en.pdf.
17. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between "sound" science and precaution, see generally Nancy
Myers, The US. and the PrecautionaryPrinciple: An NGO Response in the Context of the CartagenaProtocol
(Dec. 2000), available at http://www.sehn.org/rtfdocs/lCCP.rtf See also The Science and Environmental Health

Network (SEHN), http://www.sehn.org (giving a similar analysis).
18. See THIRD WORLD NETWORK, OPEN LETTERTO DELEGATES TO THE RESUMED SESSION OF THE FIRST
EXTRAORDINARY MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY, ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL 7 (Jan. 24, 2000) (explaining that most green
groups involved in Protocol discussions have emphasized the need for inclusion of socioeconomic impacts in the
Protocol's decision criteria and stating that "socioeconomic considerations are an integral part of assessing the
impact of GMOs... [which] could ... impair or displace indigenous technologies . . . displace crops or exports
and undermine a country's economy and cause social instability.. .") (text on file with author); see also WORLD
WIDE FUND FOR NATURE, POSITION STATEMENT, FIFTH MEETING OF THE OPEN-ENDED AD HOC WORKING
GROUP ON BIOSAFETY (Aug. 1998) (on file with author).
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through domestic regulations, rather than through a global governance regime. 19
In arguing against inclusion of socioeconomic factors as a criterion governing
importer choice, a key concern for many OECD countries and industry was that
such inclusion would conflict with multilateral trade obligations. As the Global
Industry Coalition put it: "introduction of socio-economic considerations would
erect unacceptable and inappropriate barriers to international trade, in conflict
with countries' WTO obligations." 20
These groups argued, instead, for the Protocol's decision criteria to be
compatible with the WTO's science-based obligations governing trade in
substances of contested risk. These obligations are contained in the trade
regime's Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS Agreement), which mandates that all national sanitary and phytosanitary
standards relating to plant, animal, and human health and safety have a scientific
justification to prevent their becoming unacceptable non-tariff barriers to trade.2 1
The SPS Agreement does allow for provisional restrictions on trade in the event
of insufficient scientific evidence of harm. In its understanding of precautionary
decisions, article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement allows that:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a
Member may provisionally adopt sanitary and phytosanitary
measures on the basis of available pertinent information.... In
such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk,
and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly
within a reasonable period of time.22
Such precautionary measures are, however, to be maintained only on a
provisional basis as more scientific data on risk is sought. Thus, the main thrust

19. Interview with Miami Group Delegate, supra note 15.
20. Posting from Dr. Helma Hermans, supra note 12; see also Basic Requirements, supra note 12. Forsirnix
industry perspectives, see generally Biotech. Indus. Org., The Biosafety Protocol: An Overview, at
http://www.bio.org/food&ag/bspoverview.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
21. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IA, 69 (1994)
[hereinafter SPS Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/I 5-sps.pdf According to the

SPS Agreement, "[m]embers shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained
without sufficient scientific evidence ..... Id. art. 2.2.
22. Id. art. 5.7.
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of the SPS Agreement's science-based obligations is to ensure that national health
and safety decisions are justifiable based on a scientific risk assessment.
The scientific validity of national health and safety measures is to be
demonstrated through a formal risk assessment. The SPS Agreement addresses
socioeconomic considerations only in including a limited set of "relevant
economic factors" within the required risk assessment. These include "the
potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the event of the entry,
establishment or spread of a pest or disease; the costs of control or eradication in
the territory of the importing Member; and the relative cost-effectiveness of
23
alternative approaches to limiting risk.
These are socioeconomic considerations relating to potential economic
damage resultingfrom sanitary or phytosanitary harm. Broader considerations
that are distinct from ecological or human health harm, such as the social need
for a traded product that may pose risk, its public acceptability, or consumer
opposition to it based on cultural or ethical grounds, are excluded from the SPS
Agreement's science-based decision criteria.24 As seen most prominently in the
beef-hormone conflict, and as discussed later, implementation of such decision
criteria has remained contested.
Similar disputes over decision criteria for advance informed agreement during
negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol reveal clearly that the utility of having a
global biosafety regime varied greatly for the different groups. While the
European Union, developing countries, and green groups saw the global biosafety
regime as a vehicle through which to institutionalize flexibility in decision-making
about trade in genetically modified organisms (a flexibility deriving from national
decisions based on the precautionary principle and/or socioeconomic
considerations), the Miami Group and industry saw the regime as a vehicle
through which to institutionalize predictability in decision-making about trade (a
predictability deriving from decisions based on sound science). This ongoing
conflict over the raison d'9tre of a global biosafety regime was reflected in
conflicts over the decision criteria underpinning advance informed agreement.

23. Id. art. 5.3.
24. See Wolfgang van den Daele, Interpreting the Precautionary Principle: Political Versus Legal
Perspectives, in I FORESIGHT AND PRECAUTION 213,220 (M.P. Cottam et a].
eds, 2000) (noting the debate in the
European Parliament in 1992 over a European Green Party proposal that new technologies pass tests not only of
safety, efficacy, and quality but also a "fourth hurdle" of social need).
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THE OUTCOME: PRIVILEGING SCIENCE-BASED

ADVANCE INFORMED AGREEMENT
The Cartagena Protocol's final compromise on decision criteria prior to LMO
trade calls for importer decisions to be based upon a "scientifically sound" risk
assessment; precautionary action in the face of scientific uncertainty about
adverse impacts; and a very circumscribed inclusion of socioeconomic
considerations. 25 As I argue below, such criteria can be interpreted as privileging
science-based decisions about LMO transfers. In the remainder of this essay, I
elaborate on how the decision criteria in the finalized Protocol privilege science
and conclude with some implications for global biosafety governance.
In its call for sound science, the Cartagena Protocol mandates that LMO
importer decisions be based upon a quantitative risk assessment. It further
mandates that such risk assessments be "carried out in a scientifically sound
manner... taking account of recognized risk assessment techniques. '26 The
Protocol's understanding of what constitutes a scientifically sound risk
assessment is contained in its Annex II. Importantly, it is conceded here that the
criteria to be taken into account and the data to be generated in a quantitative risk
assessment cannot be internationally mandated, given the diverse agroecological
(and, as some would argue, socioeconomic) environments within which risk
assessments are to be undertaken. Thus, the Protocol explicitly states that "the
required information [in a risk assessment] may vary in nature and level of detail
from case to case, depending on the living modified organism concerned, its
intended use and the likely potential receiving environment. '27 In recognition of
this, the information to be evaluated in a risk assessment is listed in the Annex as
"points to consider" rather than as mandatory criteria to be assessed in all cases.
This deference to context-based differences in risk assessment
notwithstanding, there is still the stipulation that a risk assessment must be
scientifically sound. Yet, in this normatively contested area, there is little
agreement on what constitutes "sound" science. A striking illustration of this is
provided by disputes over a key risk assessment principle-substantial
equivalence--that currently underpins safety evaluations of genetically modified

25. Protocol, supra note 1, arts. 10.1, 10.6, 11.6, 15, 26, at 1031, 1032, 1033-34, 1039.
26. Id. art. 15, at 1033 (emphasis added).
27. Id. annex III, para. 6, at 1045.
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organisms. 28 This term was coined by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1993 in an attempt to develop shared
"concepts and principles" to underlie safety evaluations of genetically modified
organisms. 29 The main premise of substantial equivalence is that the safety of a
transgenic food should be assessed relative to existing comparable conventional
foods, i.e. that the "substantial equivalence of a transgenic food is established by a
demonstration that the characteristics assessed for the genetically modified
organism .. .are equivalent to the same characteristics of.

..

conventional

foods." 30
This concept has fueled much debate since its elaboration in the early 1990s,
even as it has been adopted by many OECD countries in regulation of genetically
modified organisms. 3 1 Substantial equivalence has also been endorsed as an
adequate scientific basis for safety evaluations of genetically modified organisms
by international organizations such as the United Nations Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). 32 A series of
expert consultations organized by these two organizations has recommended that
safety evaluations of transgenic foods be based on the concept of substantial
equivalence.)

Significantly, however, the
acknowledges that:

latest FAO/WHO

Expert

Consultation

Several countries have used the concept of substantial
equivalence as an important component of the safety evaluations
of food and food ingredients derived from genetically modified
plants. They havefound this approachto be scientificallysound
and practical. Nevertheless, there has not been a universal
28. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, BIOTECH. AND FOOD SAFETY:

REP. OF A JOINT

FAO/WHO CONSULTATION (1996), http://www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/economic/esn/biotech/tabconts.htm
[hereinafter FAO 1996]; FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, SAFETY ASPECTS OF GENETICALLY
MODIFIED FOODS OF PLANT ORIGIN: REP. OF A JOINT FAO/WHO CONSULTATION OF FOODS DERIVED FROM
BIOTECH. (2000), http://www.who.int/fsf/GMfoodIFAO-WHOConsultationreport_2000.pdf [hereinafter FAO
2000]; Eric Millstone et al., Beyond "SubstantialEquivalence, 401 NAT., Oct. 7, 1999, at 525-26.
29. OECD, SAFETY EVALUATION OF FOODS DERIVED BY MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY: CONCEPTS AND
PRINCIPLES (1993), availableat http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007573.pdf [hereinafter OECD].
30. FAO 1996, supra note 28, at 22.
31. FAO 2000, supra note 28.
32. For the initial elaboration of this concept and early debates about it, see OECD, supra note 29, and FAO
1996, supra note 28. The latest FAO/WHO expert consultation on safety evaluations of transgenic foods contains a
detailed account of recent debates on this issue. See FAO 2000, supra note 28.
33. FAO 1996, supra note 28.
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consensus on the application of this concept. This has resulted

in criticism that the approach does not provide a sufficient basis
for safety and calls for national governments and international
34
bodies to consider alternative approaches.
However, the report concludes that: "[T]here [are] presently no alternative
strategies that would provide a better assurance of safety for genetically modified
foods than the appropriate use of the concept of substantial equivalence... [t]he
application of the concept of substantial equivalence contributes to a robust safety
assessment framework., 35 Yet, continuing conflicts and critiques of this
scientific tenet abound.3 6 For example, a controversial and widely discussed
article in the influential journal Nature, entitled "Beyond Substantial
Equivalence,, 37 critiques continued reliance on substantial equivalence in safety
assessments of genetically modified crops and foods. The authors question both
the adequacy of the tests relied upon to establish equivalence and the underlying
assumption that equivalence of transgenic with conventional foods can be
established. Their conclusion, under the provocative title "an anti-scientific test,"
states that:
Substantial equivalence is a pseudo-scientific concept because it
is a commercial and politicaljudgment masquerading as if it

were scientific. It is, moreover, inherently unscientific because
it was created primarily to provide an excuse for not requiring
biochemical or toxicological tests. It therefore serves to
discourage and inhibit informative scientific research.38
Notwithstanding such persisting conflicts over scientific principles to regulate
biotechnology, the Cartagena Protocol calls for a "scientifically sound" risk
assessment as the central basis for LMO import decisions. Clearly, then, a call
for "sound" science will not provide the predictability in trade desired by the
Miami Group or industry. Moreover, the Protocol's call for a scientifically sound
risk assessment is strikingly similar to the SPS Agreement's science-based

34. FAO 2000, supra note 28, at I (emphasis added).

35. Id. at 20.
36. For an analysis of the disputed concept of substantial equivalence, see Millstone et al., supra note 28.
37. Millstone et al., supra note 28.
38. Id. at 526 (emphasis added).
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obligations. Its interpretation in the new forum of the Cartagena Protocol is
therefore likely to remain as contested as it has been in the SPS Agreement.
As is increasingly clear, science alone cannot resolve fundamental value
conflicts, notwithstanding continued calls to base decisions in normatively
contested areas on science. In areas where the science itself is contested, a call
for "sound" science is disingenuous, since it cannot resolve, on "objective"
scientific grounds alone, the critical question of "whose" sound science. 39 The
concept of sound science has been exhaustively analyzed and critiqued in recent
years, not least because it is privileged as a basis for decision-making in the
multilateral trade regime. 4 °
A critically important component of this debate, which I explore next, is the
relationship between sound science and the precautionary principle. The
precautionary principle is becoming an increasingly important component of
governance regimes dealing with environmental and human health and safety.
Thus, a shared understanding of the precautionary principle would go a long way
toward the development of transnationally legitimate governance precepts in
contested areas such as biosafety.4 ' Yet, as argued below, the Cartagena
Protocol's language on precaution does not as yet yield such a shared
understanding.
The Protocol's provisions on precautionary decision-making state that:
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific
information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential
adverse effects of a living modified organism on the
39. For an analysis of how perceptions of the legitimacy (i.e., fairness) and the salience (i.e., relevance) of
scientific input are as critical in determining whether science can influence policymaking as any shared perceptions
of its "soundness" alone (i.e., its technical credibility), see generally INFORMATION AS INFLUENCE: HOw
INSTITUTIONS MEDIATE THE IMPACT OF SCIENCE ASSESSMENTS ON GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRs(Willa C.
Clark et al. eds., forthcoming 2002). See also Frank Biermann, Big Science, Small Impacts-in the South? The
Influence of Global Environmental Assessments on Expert Communities in India, I I GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE
297 (2001) for analysis of how global science may have minimal influence in India, if developing country concerns
are not reflected or if developing country scientists do not participate in such global assessments.
40. See generally David Wirth, The Role ofScience in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 27
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 817 (1994) (analyzing the science-based provisions of the SPS Agreement); Les Levidow &
Susan Can, Unsound Science: Transatlantic Regulatory Disputes over GM Crops, 2 INT'L J. BIOTECH. 257
(2000) (critiquing the concept of sound science as it relates to GMOs); AARTI GUPTA, Sound Science in Global
Governance of Biosafety, in LOCALIZING AND GLOBALIZING: KNOWLEDGE CULTURES OF ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT (Sheila Jasanoff & Marbeth Long-Martello eds., forthcoming 2002) (analyzing the call for "saund
science" in the Protocol negotiations).
41. For an overview of debates on the precautionary principle, see generally INTERPRETING THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Tim O'Riordan & James Cameron eds., 1994).
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conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the
Party of import, taking also into account risks to human health,
shall not prevent the Party from taking a decision, as
appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified
organism . . . in order to avoid or minimize such potential

adverse effects.4 2
This language has been hailed by the European Union, developing countries,
and green groups as the first inclusion of the precautionary principle in the
operational part of a global environmental agreement and one of the most
noteworthy contributions of the Cartagena Protocol.4 3 In contrast, however, the
Miami Group and industry representatives have emphasized that the Protocol's
language on precaution does not go further than the discretion already permitted
to importers of risky products under the multilateral trade regime and its SPS
Agreement.4 4
It is useful, therefore, to examine more closely the language in the Protocol to
assess whether a shared basis for governance, generalizable to other anticipatory
issues, is discernible here. Examining the Protocol's language on precaution
reveals, first and foremost, that it does not operationalize the precautionary
principle, as widely alleged, since no single universally shared version exists.
Instead, the Protocol's language reflects a mix of existing understandings of
precaution as articulated in other global fora, including Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration and article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.
Comparing these various versions reveals that the Protocol's language on
precaution is largely compatible with both Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration and
article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. Although these articulations are compatible,
Principle 15 can be construed as setting a stricter standard for precautionary
42. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 10.6, 11.8, at 1031, 1032.
43. See, e.g., Montreal 2000: An Amazing Compromise, 59 COURRIER DE LA PLANETE 7 (2001) (intaviewing
Christoph Bail, a lead spokesperson for the European Union during the Protocol negotiations); see also THIRD
WORLD NETWORK, supra note 18.
44. Interview with Miami Group Delegates, in Montreal (Jan. 2000). For written statements on the key
provisions of the Protocol, issued two weeks after finalization of the Protocol at the end of January 2000, see OFFIE
OF THE SPOKESMAN, U.S. DEP'T STATE, FACT SHEET: THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY (Feb. 16,

2000), availableat http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/biotech/00021601.htm. The Fact Sheet states that "the
language [on precaution] does not replace science-based decision-making nor does it authorize decisions contrary to
a country's WTO obligations." Id at (e). For a similar interpretation from another key Miami Group member,
Australia, see also DEP' T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, ENV' T AUSTL., DISCUSSION PAPER: PREPARATIONSOF
THE FIRST MEETING OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY

(Oct. 2000), at http://www.dfat.gov.au/environment/bsp/biosub/discussionpaper.htm#outline.
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actions than the Protocol, given its injunction that precautionary actions are to be
taken (only) when "serious and irreversible" damage might result from inaction
and when such actions meet an additional criterion of cost-effectiveness. 45 At
the same time, Principle 15 also includes the concept of "full" scientific certainty,
which is often equated with a "zero-risk" approach by opponents of this
language, who argue that full scientific certainty about lack of harm is never
obtainable.
A comparison with Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration is particularly relevant
to evaluating whether the Cartagena Protocol's inclusion of precaution can
provide a shared basis for action. This is because there is a separate and explicit
reference to Principle 15 in the Protocol's overall objectives: "In accordancewith
the precautionaryapproachcontained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to
ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling
and use of living modified organisms...46
Including two compatible, yet slightly distinct, versions of precaution within
this one global regime allows for multiple and potentially conflicting interpretations
about the legitimate triggers for precautionary action under the Protocol.
Therefore, while it certainly provides flexibility in interpretation to importers of
LMOs who wish to exercise precaution in allowing LMO transfers, it does not yet
provide a common basis for action in this contested area. Although inclusion of
this language in the Protocol is indeed a significant first step, its articulation here
does not categorically shift the advantage to either the proponents or the
opponents of reliance on precaution in governing transfers of LMOs. Rather, it
ensures that the battle of interpretation will continue in this and other fora on a
case-by-case basis.47
Notwithstanding the potential for multiple interpretations, however, the
Protocol's language on precaution contains one important and relatively
unambiguous similarity to the multilateral trade regime's understanding of
precaution. As seen earlier from the language of the SPS Agreement's artic le 5.7,
45. See Rio Declaration, supra note 14, princ. 15, at 879.
46. Protocol, supra note I, art. 1,at 1027 (emphasis added).
47. One difference between article 5.7 of WTO-SPS and the Protocol is that the SPS Agreement's language
emphasizes that precautionary decisions are to be provisional and should be reviewed within a "reasonable period"
of time. SPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 5.7. The Protocol's version identifies no time frame within which
precautionary decisions are to be reviewed and can thus be construed as allowing more flexibility to countries in
taking import-restrictive actions in the face of scientific uncertainty. However, the SPS Agreement's injunction to
review actions within a reasonable period of time is sufficiently vague so as to make this distinction less critical.
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the starting point of legitimate precautionary action in the trade regime is a
science-based risk assessment. The Protocol's language can be read as a similar
call for precautionary actions to be grounded in a quantitative risk assessment.
This i evident from the emphasis in the Protocol's language on scientific
uncertainty about the extent of an adverse impact posed by an LMO, rather than
uncertainty about whether or not an adverse impact exists. This emphasis on the
extent of an adverse impact can be interpreted as requiring prior scientific
evidence of the existence of an adverse impact before precautionary action can
legitimately be taken.
Thus, the language on precaution in the Cartagena Protocol can also be
interpreted as not allowing countries to go beyond what is already permitted
within the SPS Agreement's science-based obligations. It can be interpreted as
privileging a quantitative risk assessment as the legitimate starting point for
precautionary action, as does the SPS Agreement. Hence, the language on
precaution can be read as privileging science-based importer decision-making
prior to LMO transfers, in a manner similar to the call for a "scientifically sound"
risk assessment.
This privileging of science is further reinforced by the manner in which
socioeconomic considerations are addressed by the Cartagena Protocol. In its
final compromise on this issue, the Protocol allows for very limited consideration
of adverse socioeconomic impacts in importer decisions about LMO transfers.
Specifically, it allows countries to "take into account, consistent with their
international obligations, socioeconomic considerations arising from the impact of
[living modified organisms] on the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity.... 8
This is a very narrow formulation in that it links socioeconomic impacts to
impacts on biodiversity, in a manner similar to the WTO's treatment of
socioeconomic factors in the SPS Agreement. This excludes many concerns of
particular interest to developing countries, such as loss of traditional livelihoods or
increased dependence on privately controlled seed. In addition, the proviso that
decisions based on socioeconomic considerations are to be consistent with a
country's international obligations eisures that the Protocol's allowance of
socioeconomic factors does not go beyond what the WTO already permits. As
the lead negotiator for developing countries, Tewolde Berhan Egziabher of

48. Protocol, supra note 1,art, 26,. at 1039.
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Ethiopia, put it following a temporary collapse in negotiations for the Protocol in
February 1999 in Cartagena:
The Miami Group and European Groups would not allow the
use of socioeconomic variables even in risk assessment. The
[draft article on socioeconomic considerations] is useless
because it is qualified by the phrase 'tonsistent with their
international obligations" which means, in effect, that they have
to give prioritytofacilitatingfreetrade. Thus Southern nations
are expected to accept whatever disruption genetically modified
organisms might cause their societies and economies.4 9
The limited inclusion of socioeconomic factors in the Protocol further
validates the claim in this essay-that science-based choice is privileged in this
global regime. Such a privileging of science-based choice can be seen as akin to
a problematic technicalization of what are fundamentally normative conflicts in
the area of biosafety. One potentially far-reaching implication of such a
privileging of science in global governance fora is that a broad range of concerns
about the nature and consequences of technological change may have to be
articulated by all groups in the language of technical risk. Although normative
concepts such as justice, equity, fairness, or choice will remain key drivers in
conflicts over global governance, they may increasingly need to be recast in the
language of technical harm.
A striking example is provided by the rationales relied upon to regulate
imports of transgenic agricultural commodities in India. In the global forum,
developing countries, including India, justified the need for national choice prior to
trade in LMOs by invoking concerns over risks to biodiversity or human health.
However, the primary concern in India over imports of transgenic commodities
are socioeconomic, rather than related merely to ecological or health harm
narrowly defined. Yet, such broader national-level concerns over technological
change were couched in the global arena in terms of risk in order to receive a
hearing within global governance fora that privilege the language of technically

49. Tewolde
Berhan
G.
Egziabher,
Safety
Denied,
OUR
http://www.ourplanet.com/imgversn/102/viewpoint.html (emphasis added).

PLANET,
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1999,
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assessable harm. 50 Such a privileging of technical risk assessment as a basis for
national decisions is likely to have particularly important but as yet underexamined implications for developing countries, which rely relatively less on
technical input into decision-making, and which have to consider diverse
socioeconomic priorities in governing uptake and safe use of new technologies.
In anticipatory areas of technological change, then, where the science
remains contested and uncertain, and where concerns about adoption and safe
use of technologies transcend scientifically measurable harm, it remains important
to go beyond science-based mediation of normative conflicts. In addition to
scientific input, some form of social impact assessment should also be a critical
component of anticipatory global and national governance regarding the safe
uptake and use of new technologies. 5 ! While any call to assess the social impact
of technological change appears to go against the grain of the fundamental
premises of an increasingly globalized market system, its perils and its promise
52
for anticipatory governance need to be explored.
The ardent debates over the precautionary principle as a basis for decisionmaking in the Cartagena Protocol provide a precursor to the greater set of
challenges inherent in agreeing to and implementing any form of social impact
assessment as a basis for transnational governance. However, the multiple
challenges inherent in this endeavor should not be reason enough to abstain from
considering such governance innovations in the search for shared bases for
action.
III. WHY

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE STILL MATTERS

In the final analysis, even though the biosafety area remains heavily
contested, the rationale for anticipatory global governance regimes is clear: there
is dire need for institutional and governance structures to co-evolve with
technological changes that have transformative potential, rather than to follow in
50. For a detailed analysis of the relevance of the Protocol for biosafety regulation in India, see Aarti Gupta,
Belfer Ctr. for Sci. & Int'l Affairs, Governing Biosafety in India: The Relevance of the CartagenaProtocol (Oct
2000), at http://environment.harvard.edu/gea/pubs/2000%2D24.pdf.
51. Some green groups have also called for such assessments. See, e.g., WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE,

supra note 18; see also Gaskell et al., supra note 10, at 938 (stating that "international debate and decisionmaking must go beyond evidence based solely on scientific risks. The moral and ethical dimensions of
biotechnology that underlie public concerns need to be understood and taken into account.").
52. For detailed discussion of the innovative concept of "real-time technology assessment" to observe and
influence the process by which social values become embedded in technological innovations, see David H. Guston
& Daniel Sarewitz, Real-time Technology Assessment, 23 TEC. IN SOC. (forthcoming 2001).
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their wake after changes have become entrenched or irreversible. Striking in this
regard is Professor Roger Dworkin's statement about regulation of genetic
engineering more than two decades ago. Writing in the late 1970s and critiquing
the trend at the time of self-regulation by scientists of this emerging area,
Dworkin stated that "our greatest need is for an institution that can anticipate
53
problems before options are foreclosed.
This urgent need remains more than two decades later. The critical function
that the emerging biosafety regime serves, notwithstanding its limitations, is to
provide an institutional context within which problems can be anticipated and
options considered and exercised, rather than foreclosed through inaction. Even
though shared governance precepts, such as the precautionary principle or
socioeconomic considerations, remain contested, vague, and/or underinstitutionalized, this very ambiguity and conflict suggests a pressing need to
continue searching for shared understandings through the vehicle of global
governance regimes.

53. Roger Dworkin, Science, Society and the Expert Town Meeting: Some Comments on Asilomar, 51 S. CAL
L. REV. 1471, 1481 (1978).

